You will likely find this one of the most difficult chapters of the book, as it seeks sociological answers to one of the most challenging of all moral and philosophical questions: What is nature? This is a highly abstract question and many of you probably will have difficulty appreciating its sociological significance. Nevertheless, it is a hugely significant matter for our moral values, the chapter argues.

The chapter begins by considering a basic sociological contradiction in our ideas of nature: the contradiction between moral separatism (the idea that people are separate from nature in some way) and moral holism (the idea that people are a part of nature). If people are to “follow nature,” they must be separate from nature for this statement to have any meaning. But unless we are part of nature, nature has no relevance for us. And if we are part of nature, it is superfluous to ask people to follow it for, as creatures of nature, we must already be doing so. Moreover, if people are part of nature, then it cannot serve as a source of moral value free from the pollution of social interests. All moral philosophies of nature must grapple in some way with this contradiction, the chapter argues. It traces the social history of how the ancient Greeks, the ancient Taoists, and the environmental philosophers of the present day have done so.

This discussion leads up to the central point of the chapter: the observation that nature, whatever else it is, is a social construction guided by social interests, and not something apart from those interests. The chapter distinguishes between two forms of social construction, the social selection of particular material features of nature to concentrate on and the social reflection of social ideas into our very understanding of what the features of nature are to begin with. The chapter draws examples of both social selection and social reflection from:

the parallels between the rise of Darwin’s theory of evolution and the rise of free-market capitalism in mid-nineteenth century Britain;
the scientific racism of Samuel George Morton’s studies in craniometry which sought to prove the biological superiority of whites; and,
the environmental determinism of Ellsworth Huntington’s attempts to connect favorable climates with the degree of civilization in a region.

All these social constructions of nature favor certain social groups over others, thus promoting social interests instead of escaping them. The chapter then turns to the social construction of the environment and the social interests that are involved. A discussion of the realist-constructionist debate helps illuminate the fundamental tension in environmental sociology between materialist versus idealist approaches.

Four main examples are discussed:

the social construction of the “ozone hole”;
the Western idea that “wilderness” represents a realm without interference from people and how local peoples have sometimes been incorrectly blamed for wildlife losses, leading to their forcible removal from wilderness areas;
the conflicts over the construction of certain landscapes as worthy of tourism; and,
the use of environmental protection arguments to exclude poorer people from wealthy neighborhoods and to limit immigration.

The chapter concludes by discussing the limits to a purely social constructionist perspective on nature, arguing for a dialogic awareness of the role of material factors in social construction and vice versa. In making this case, the chapter draws on the French sociologist Bruno Latour’s actor network theory, and related concepts such as actants, fabrication, factishes, performances, and the social inconvenience of “nature.”

This leads to a discussion of the creation by industrialists of environmental non-problems in recent climate debates. The chapter then has a brief discussion of the concept of resonance, the idea that we seek parallels between our social and physical forms of understanding but that neither the ideal nor the material side takes ideological precedence: It’s another ecological dialogue. The final paragraph then argues that nature is an inherently paradoxical moral concept that everything is “natural” and, at the same time, nothing is.